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The Philosopher’s Stone: AI Discrimination in Recruitment Can Turn Claims into Gold, If You 
Can Find It 
 Early 20th century American history is defined by the mechanization that transformed 
human life more in a span of decades than all of the previous millennia.1 Driven by technology,  
this rapid change is appropriately called the Industrial Revolution.2 From the steam engines that 
connected the ends of our country together, to the light bulb that quickly found its way into 
almost every home and every street, human life was redefined in a matter of decades. Today’s 
technology far surpasses that of the Industrial Revolution and continues to progress at an 
exponential rate as we enter a new technological era of our own.3 The gap between world 
changing technological developments shrinks with every milestone as we computerize our lives.4 
This new revolution is defining the 21st century the way the Industrial Revolution 
defined the 20th, and the key to understanding the future comes with understanding artificial 
intelligence, or AI for short.5 The steam engine of the digital age, AI dominates an ever-
increasing portion of our lives, and by extension the legal field.6 Advanced search engines in our 
 
1 Peter Marsh, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 218 (2012). Accessed April 25, 2021. 
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2 Jan de Vries, The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution, 54 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 
249, 249-251 (June 1994). 
3 Marsh, supra note 1, at 222. 
4 Id. At 220. 
5 Michael Horowitz & Paul Scharre, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERY POLICYMAKER NEEDS TO KNOW 3 
(2018). Accessed April 25, 2021. 
6 See Eileen Smith Ewing, Message from the Chair Artificial Intelligence: Revolution or Evolution? ABA SCITECH 
LAW (2017). 
beloved Westlaw and Lexis databases, personal assistants in our phones like Siri, and countless 
other examples show how AI has revolutionized an attorney’s job.  
AI has also revolutionized the very process of getting a job. ZipRecruiter, one of many 
job board and social networks that specialize in advertising employment opportunities, has 25 
million monthly active users and, as of March 11th, 2021, 9 million job postings.7 ZipRecruiter 
and its competitors are more than just digital job boards, they offer sophisticated programs that 
help employers find the best fit for their vacancies. Job boards like LinkedIn utilize AI that learn 
primarily from employer input; the advertising employer reviews applicants brought through the 
service and rates their eligibility.8 The AI then learns from those ratings and uses that 
information to find new applicants that fit the trend of high-rated applicants.9 Although most 
applicant-focused AI work the same on a fundamental level, the inner workings of these 
machines are jealously guarded by a combination of legal protections and trade secrecy.10 
In 2014 Amazon created its own recruitment AI in an effort to cut out the middleman and 
potentially even branch into the employment market themselves.11 Amazon, like many other 
giants in the digital age, was looking for the “holy grail” of recruitment; a program that would 
not only filter out bad candidates but put the perfect fits at the top.12 Ideally, this program would 
replace the time-consuming and resource-intensive interview process that defines the modern 
 
7 Craig Smith, ZipRecruiter Statistics and Facts (2021) | By the Numbers 
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10 Michael Risch, Hidden in Plain Sight, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1635 (2016). 
11 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Amazon built an AI tool to hire people but had to shut it down because it was 
discriminating against women, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct 10, 2018, 5:47 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-built-ai-to-hire-people-discriminated-against-women-2018-10. 
12 Id. 
understanding of employment.13 But in 2015 Amazon discovered a flaw with the potential to 
create a legal nightmare.14 Amazon’s AI had decided that because most successful software 
developers and technical employees were men, the best candidates are men.15 The AI penalized 
resumes for any mention of the word “women’s” and downgraded the value of degrees from all-
women’s colleges.16 Amazon edited the programs to no longer make decisions based on sex, but 
still scrapped the project a year later.17 
Amazon narrowly avoided an incident by scrapping the secret project before any damage 
was done. Amazon is a company often on the cutting edge of technology, but they are but one of 
a number of tech giants.18 Google and Facebook are fierce competitors in the field, and it is not 
uncommon for all three to be working on the same goal with their own respective projects. This 
is not to mention companies of equal size such as Wal-Mart who have just as much interest in a 
computer program that could supplement if not replace their expansive HR departments. This 
gives ample justification to ask if Amazon is not the only incident of AI discrimination to have 
happened, but rather the only one to have been caught. 
It is possible, even probable, that AI out in the market today that suffer from the same 
flaws as Amazon’s AI.19 It would be a clear-cut case of systemic disparate treatment, or 
intentional discrimination, if a human did what Amazon’s AI did. The theory of disparate 
treatment has evolved through court precedent and legislative amendments to encompass 
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18 See Julien Lauret, Amazon’s sexist AI recruiting tool: how did it go so wrong? BECOMING HUMAN (Aug 16, 
2019), https://becominghuman.ai/amazons-sexist-ai-recruiting-tool-how-did-it-go-so-wrong-e3d14816d98e. 
19 Id. 
employers and their direct subordinates, but it is unclear if it applies to AI.20 AI in general has 
little to no meaningful legislation, AI in the workplace included. One of the few attempts at 
legislating this growing field comes out of Illinois that does little more than require employers 
give notice to job applicants they are being monitored by AI during interviews.21 Another 
attempt at AI legislation is the Algorithmic Accountability Act, which was introduced to the 
House and Senate floors in 2019.22 Originally introduced in response to a law suit by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development against Facebook for discriminating against 
protected classes for housing advertisements, the bill would be a step towards addressing AI in a 
similar vein as employment discrimination.23 The bill falls short of properly addressing the 
growing concerns, as it would at best only regulate automated decision making, and would do 
nothing for potential plaintiffs should any discrimination occur regardless.24  
Until legislators catch up to the rate of technological growth, lawyers and courts alike 
must work within existing framework to adapt to an evolving world. Given the current state of 
employment law and political climate regarding AI, employers should be wary when using such 
tools in recruitment efforts. An employer using an AI that discriminates against protected classes 
under Title VII and ADEA can find themselves liable under either the theories of disparate 
impact or disparate treatment. Drawing on product defect and manufacturer liability, a new cause 
of action can arise allowing plaintiffs to sue the developers of a discriminating AI when the AI 
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creates its own discriminatory biases. Although Congressional amendments to labor law will be 
needed before long, courts can work within existing framework to ensure justice for plaintiffs. 
The legal frameworks for employment discrimination predate recruitment AI, but they 
still establish the foundation for legal claims.25 Proving these claims is challenging, as with any 
discrimination case. Evidentiary hurdles native to discrimination claims apply to these new 
issues just as much as traditional discrimination actions.26 The promise of a line of code 
revealing an AI is discriminating based on protected status, a philosopher’s stone that can turn a 
claim to gold, may entice plaintiff-serving employment firms to pursue claims against AI-using 
employers. The claims are valid and legal minds in the field of labor law should be aware of 
what may become a common place issue in years rather than decades. 
The question of liability is recognizable as one well-litigated and grounded in legal 
precedent when AI is stripped of the mystique of science fiction. AI is a tool, and an employer is 
liable for harms caused by use of the tool.27 The deciding factor between what kind of 
discrimination, whether it be disparate impact or disparate treatment, is whether the employer 
was aware of the AI’s discriminating tendencies. To fully understand this application of law, it is 
crucial that a basic understanding of AI is accompanied by knowledge of the twin theories of 
disparate impact and treatment. This provides guidance as to employment liability and reveals 
the practical limitations of the law as it stands regarding evidentiary requirements and burdens on 
potential plaintiffs. 
I. Artificial Intelligence in a Nutshell 
 
25 Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 524-526 (2018). 
26 Id. at 553. 
27 Id. at 525. 
Before an analysis of the law in question and how AI fits into the current employment 
law scheme, it should be explained what exactly constitutes an AI and how they work. A simple 
explanation is that AI are computers that learn.28 This sets out a very broad category often 
disappointing to those who grew up on Star Trek. “Simple” computers such as calculators and 
home computers fail to classify as AI, while a phone’s predictive text does.29 There are two kinds 
of AI; narrow or “weak” AI and general or “strong” AI.30 These definitions come from an AI’s 
ability to learn, machine learning and deep learning.31 Regardless of the type of AI or the way it 
learns, all AI are subject to biases and this is the foundation for many of the legal implications 
arising from AI.32 A subtle yet compounding complication to understanding AI comes from the 
difficulty in understanding a particular AI and cracking the black box.33 
a. Weak and Strong AI 
There are two broad categories which are used to classify AI: narrow AI and Artificial 
General Intelligence (AGI). Narrow AI, sometimes referred to as “weak AI” are designed and 
developed for a narrow scope of purpose.34 While they excel at those limited tasks, a narrow AI 
designed to alert Westlaw users of a personally relevant opinion recently published would be 
unable to screen their emails for virus-laden links. AGI, or strong AI, are those that can apply 
intelligence to any problem at hand.35 The subject of many a novel and movie, these AI are being 
developed and will have an enormous impact in almost every legal field. This is a future some 
 
28 ITechLaw, RESPONSIBLE AI: A GLOBAL POLICY FRAMEWORK, 20, (Charles Morgan, 1st Ed. 2019). 
29 The term “intelligence” refers to an AI’s ability to learn, and not its ability to act intelligently as we use the term. 
No one has ever accused a smartphone’s predictive text of being intelligent. 
30 IBM, Strong AI, IBM CLOUD EDUCATION (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/strong-ai. 
31 Id. 
32 ITechLaw, supra at note 24, at 136. 
33 Id. at 147. 
34 IBM, supra at note 29. 
35 Id. 
time away as strong AI of this caliber are rarely seen outside research labs, and narrow AI 
dominate the market.36 The immediate issues are those posed by the narrow AI widely available 
on the market now and still being developed and improved. 
b. Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
Most AI are like those that LinkedIn uses; a program that takes data and establishes 
patterns from it to modify future actions. These AI do this through algorithms and a process 
known as machine learning.37 An algorithm is a process or set of rules to be followed for 
problem-solving applications.38 Although the term is shrouded in scientific clout, an algorithm is 
something legal minds are trained for. Legal professionals form sets of rules from case 
precedent, administrative regulations, and statutory law, and then apply sets of facts to them to 
create legal outcomes. AI do much the same with coded programming and gathered data. 
Machine learning is the term for computers learning through algorithms.39 When a 
computer encounters a problem, it extracts patterns from data.40 The AI then uses those patterns 
to associate outcomes with certain features that can then be applied to new situations.41 This 
allows the AI to take information and patterns from one problem and on to the next, that new 
knowledge making it better equipped to deal with future problems.42 Deep learning is considered 
a subfield or evolution of machine learning and is more complicated.43 Replicating the neural 
network of a brain, the AI has a “thought process” that goes through neural networks of decision 
 
36 Id. 
37 ITechLaw, supra at note 24, at 21. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 




making.44 The technical aspect behind this is fascinating, but largely irrelevant from a legal 
perspective and it will suffice to say that deep learning enables more sophisticated and powerful 
AI.45 
c. Algorithmic Bias 
No matter the kind of learning an AI utilizes or their purpose, an AI learns. An AI’s 
programming allows it to learn, and as with anything taught, it is susceptible to bias.46  
Algorithm bias is the term for a systemic pattern of errors creating unfair or undesired 
outcomes.47 This bias can occur on either level; the machine’s own learning can create and 
develop biases, or the program can inherit biases from its developer.48 
An AI can find patterns without accounting for the cause of them and draw an incorrect 
correlation. Relating back to Amazon, that AI determined a successful tech employee was male 
by finding a pattern that most successful employees were male. It did not consider the underlying 
issues of gender breakdowns in tech,49 and that only about 25% of computing roles are held by 
women.50 Underrepresentation of women in STEM fields is a well-known issue and although 




46 Genie Barton, Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick, Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and 




49 Jenny Little, Ten years on, why are there still so few women in tech? THE GUARDIAN (Jan 2, 2020 7:19 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/careers/2020/jan/02/ten-years-on-why-are-there-still-so-few-women-in-tech. 
50 Rani Molla and Renee Lightner, Diversity in Tech, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 10, 2016 12:00 PM), 
http://graphics.wsj.com/diversity-in-tech-companies/. 
problems experienced by humans. While some critics claim this social blindness is one of the 
greatest virtues of a computer, this creates a perpetuating bias.51 
When a computer mistakenly finds a correlation and develops a rule based on the pattern 
it has discovered, it applies that rule towards the next problem and set of data.52 Since this 
underlying rule is wrong, the next pattern it finds and next rule it creates is based on faulty logic 
and is more likely than not to also be wrong.53 This chain eventually ends in a program that is 
entirely mistaken, and all results from a single bias.54 
The other source of bias in AI are the biases of the developer. A prime example is facial 
recognition software. Facial recognition technology is a rapidly expanding market, from 
governments that seek to increase security through identification databases to retail chains that 
seek to create stores without any employees.55 Facial recognition software suffers from bias; the 
three leading facial recognition AI have a 30% higher error rate when identifying darker skinned 
people.56 Developers determined that the primary causes for these errors came not from the AI’s 
learning, but from the system development itself.57 Development teams were primarily white 
men, and the facial feature points the program focused on were based on those distinguishable in 
white men.58 
 
51 See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 557 (2019). 
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The AI was created from by a team with specific perspective that led to overlooking 
important distinguishing features. The own-race bias (ORB) is a phenomenon that has been the 
subject of intensive psychological study for decades.59 The two prominent theories explaining 
this phenomenon are the exposure theory and the contact theory.60 The former theory is that 
exposure at a young age to one’s own race shapes the facial recognition function of the brain, 
and the latter theory that since a person is more likely to come into contact with members of their 
own race more often and thus have a larger mental database to draw patterns across.61 Under 
either theory though, this phenomenon is inherited by the developed AI and it logically follows 
that any bias held by the developer is likely to occur in the AI.62 
d. The Black Box 
One final matter to mind is the accessibility of AI and AI generated data. Many think that 
because an AI relies on written code, its mind can be read by looking into its inner workings. 
Unfortunately AI code reads more like tea leaves than literature, and the inner workings are often 
called “black boxes” due to their virtually impenetrable nature.63 Black boxes are volumes of 
information obscured in part due to the secretive nature of developers, and in part because of the 
nature of the data itself.64 Developers guard the details of their AI’s inner workings to prevent 
piracy and plagiarism.65 This secrecy compounds the already befuddling nature of AI, as they are 
so complicated, technical, and overwhelming by the sheer quantity of information and composite 
 
59 Hoo Keat Wong, Ian Stephen, David Keeble, The Own-Race Bias for Race Recognition in a Multiracial Society, 
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY (Mar. 6th, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00208/full. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See generally Najibi, supra at note 50. 
63 ITechLaw, supra at note 24, at 105. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
code.66 This black box within a black box permeates any legal issue in which AI is involved and 
will quickly become an evidentiary quagmire for litigators across the legal landscape.  
II. Relevant Current Law for Analysis 
Although it has been around two decades since the last major employment bill has made 
its way through Congress, employment law has branched and grown in that time. Employment 
law has grown more like a briar bush than a beech tree though, and it is easy to become 
entangled in the mess. In regard to hiring and recruitment, there are primarily two theories of 
employment discrimination.67 The theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact allow 
challenges to practices that discriminate against the individual, discrimination being a term of 
art.68 Discrimination is defined as “the unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of 
people… especially on the grounds of race, age, or sex.”69  The field of law governing 
discriminatory hiring practices and promotions is primarily rooted in two Acts; Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)70 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).71 
Products liability in some senses is simpler than the relevant employment law because 
products liability can be strict liability.72 In other it is more nuanced because it derives from tort 
and contractual law, governed by state product liability law rather than federal statute.73 For the 
 
66 Id. at 106. 
67 Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 94 (9th 
ed.2020). 
68 Id. 
69 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 488 (2001). 
70 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e. 
71 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§621-633a. 
72 LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/products_liability (last visited Apr. 27, 2021). 
73 Id. 
purposes of the relevant analysis, the approach the majority of states take towards product 
liability specific to software will be discussed. 
a. Disparate Treatment 
Disparate treatment is the more obvious of the two discrimination theories, and the most 
common.74 Disparate treatment “is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The 
employer simply treats some people less favorably because of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”75 In lay terms, disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. Disparate 
treatment is proven in one of two ways; demonstrating a formal policy of prohibited 
discrimination, or by proving a pattern of employment decisions that circumstantially prove a 
practice of discrimination.76  
Employers rarely have formal policies of illegal discrimination though, and plaintiffs 
generally have to establish a pattern of employment decisions to prove a practice of 
discrimination.77 The common structure for proving this is established by McDonnell Douglas 
and holds that a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer 
discriminated.78 When a formal policy of discrimination exists, the plaintiff has the burden to 
prove a prima facie case.79 A plaintiff is required to 1) prove she belongs to a protected class, 2) 
that she applied and was qualified for a vacant position, 3) despite her qualifications, she was 
rejected, and 4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
 
74 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to 
Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 103 (2009). 
75 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
76 Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 94 (9th 
ed.2020). 
77 There are a number of exceptions to the blanket prohibition of discrimination based on protected classes. The 
most obvious and common are ministerial positions and other religious based jobs. 
78 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802. 
79 Id. 
people with the plaintiff’s qualifications.80 From there the burden shifts to the employer to put 
into evidence a nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory decision.81 This shifts 
the burden of proof back to the plaintiff, who must then show that the proffered reason was 
simply a pretext.82 Proving pretext offers numerous evidentiary problems and few cases survive 
pleadings, let alone summary judgment.83 
b. Disparate Impact 
Policies that are nondiscriminatory on their face but have a disproportionately negative 
effect on members of legally protected groups are considered to have a disparate impact.84 
Because these policies are facially neutral, disparate impact has no intent requirement and looks 
at the protected class as a group, contrary to the purely individualized scope of disparate 
treatment.85 Tests with little to no relation to an employee’s performance,86 arbitrary 
requirements as to height, weight87, and even more subjective criteria like specific skills88 can 
classify as policies with disparate impact.  
Disparate impact came to the legal centerstage in Griggs, a Supreme Court case holding 
that Title VII prohibited facially neutral employment policies resulting in discrimination on the 
basis of a protected trait.89 To make a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must prove 
 
80See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. At 803. 
83 See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment 
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 886-89 (2007). 
84 Frank D. Vinik. "Disparate impact." Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/topic/disparate-
impact. 
85 Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 96 (9th 
ed.2020). 
86 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
87  See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
88 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
89 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
that 1) she is a part of a protected class, 2) the employer has implemented a practice that 
produces an adverse effect to protected individuals, 3) because of status as part of the protected 
class.90 To prove the third element of causation, the plaintiff will use either the statistical 
significance test or the four-fifths rule.91 Statistical significance tests requires a plaintiff to prove 
a specified level that the observed disparity is not due to random chance, the level usually being 
ninety-five percent.92 The four-fifths test requires a plaintiff prove a group’s pass rate is four-
fifths less than another group.93 
The evidentiary hurdles of disparate impact claims stem from convincing a court of one’s 
preferred statistical correlation. Disparate impact claims do not follow structures like McDonnell 
Douglas, and instead rely heavily on statistics, allowing comparisons such as a protected class’s 
representation in a certain employer’s practice and that class’s representation in the local labor 
market.94 The current trend across Circuit courts follows the Second Circuit in holding that the 
existence of a disparity amongst a general population does not necessarily correlate to the pool of 
applicants qualified for the jobs in question.95 Beyond that, the subject of many arguments in 
disparate impact claims comes down to which statistics the court should use, and how.  
c. Title VII and the ADEA 
Title VII gives protection to individual employees from discrimination based on; “race, 
color, religion, sex96, or national origin.97” Protected activities include failure or refusal to “hire 
 
90 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
91 See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward A Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773 (2009). 
92 Id. At 774. 
93 Id. 
94 See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
95 See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2020). 
96 As of 2020, The Supreme Court has read “sex” to includes homosexuals and transgenders. Bostock v. Clayton 
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
97 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a). 
or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,…” or “to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees… in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee….”98 Title 
VII’s recognition of disparate impact claims is written into the Act itself, requiring a plaintiff to 
prove a “particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact… and the respondent 
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”99 Case law provides for Title VII claims on disparate 
treatment, as noted in McDonnel Douglas.100 
The other Act which protects employees and applicants is the ADEA, though it does so 
only for those over the age of 40.101 The ADEA uses near identical language in its prohibition of 
employer actions. 
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s age; 
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual’s age…102 
 
98 Id. 
99 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
100 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
101 29 U.S.C. §§631(a). 
102 29 U.S.C. §§623. 
To some extent, the ADEA offers less protection due to the nature of the protected class. 
Age is often accompanied by physical change and traits that may be job relevant. This makes it 
more likely there exists a legitimate reason for discrimination relating to business necessity, or at 
least easier for employers to establish a believable pretext. Despite this practical limitation, 
courts analyze ADEA claims near the same way they analyze Title VII claims, reading Title VII 
interpretation into the ADEA.103 Claims of disparate impact and treatment for ADEA cases are 
equally viable and follow the same structure and evidentiary requirements as those under Title 
VII, and can effectively be treated as the same body of law for the purposes of AI in hiring.104 
While both disparate impact and disparate treatment are recognized under both applicable 
bases of employment law, the two claims will rarely apply to the same set of facts. The core of 
disparate impact is that the policy or action challenged is facially neutral. Employment 
discrimination as a field of law is focused on the individual and as-applied cases, and disparate 
treatment is the epitome of this. To prove a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must prove that 
they were discriminated against because of their protected status. Disparate impact is less 
focused, as it challenges a policy which will disproportionately affect a specific class. While the 
discrimination case will be focused on the individual bringing suit, the case will focus on a 
policy that affects an entire class. While it is important to keep the differences in mind since the 
practical differences of the two theories render a bright line between the two, AI manages to blur 
that line. 
 
103 In relation to awarding privileges and benefits to employees in a discriminatory manner, the Supreme Court held 
that “this interpretation of Title VII… applies with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the 
substantive provisions of the ADEA ‘were derived in haec verba from Title VII.’” This interpretation has been 
applied broadly to most aspects of discrimination in the ADEA. 
104 Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 18 (9th 
ed.2020). 
d. Products Liability 
Products-liability is a claim derived from contract and tort law that a party can hold 
manufacturers, processors, distributors, and sellers of products liable for personal injury or 
property damage allegedly resulting from use.105 A products liability claim may be brought under 
several theories, including strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence.106 A plaintiff can 
bring a products liability claim under a theory of strict liability when a product; 1) contains a 
manufacturing defect even when a product is used with all possible care, 2) is defective in design 
when the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced or avoided by adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design, or 3) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the provision of such.107  
To prove a defective design under strict liability, a plaintiff must prove; 1) the seller was 
engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the harm, 2) the product was defective 
when sold, 3) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, 4) the product 
was received by the consumer in substantially the same condition as produced, and 5) the 
plaintiff’s damages were a direct and proximate cause of the defect.108 There is a split amongst 
jurisdictions as to whether there is a difference between negligence and strict liability in design 
defect cases.109  
 
105 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 1. 
106 Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV, 152 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying South Carolina 
law). 
107 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 (1998). 
108 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 530 (citing Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170 (1999)). 
109 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 873 (citing Stanley v. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144 (Me. 
1983)). 
For our purposes, there is no meaningful difference between the two tort theories because 
any harm caused would be purely economic and exist under the contractual portion of products 
liability.110 Under contract law, a party can contract a manufacturer, designer, or distributor of a 
product to indemnify and hold them harmless in case of liability in a civil suit.111 Specifically to 
software, neither state legislatures nor courts have been unified in their application of product 
liability to software.112 Although there is growing pressure for legislative action in this regard 
due to the inadequacy of current law, there is a growing trend in application of products liability 
to software.113 For the purposes of analyzing AI-based claims under Title VII and the ADEA, 
there will be an assumption that a court embraces this trend.  
III. Liability and AI in Employment 
Recruitment AI can be designed in an incomprehensible variety of designs, but in the 
end, they will share certain aspects as they aim to achieve the same goal. AI used in employment 
will be used as tools to streamline the two most tedious aspects of hiring, reaching applicants and 
filtering applicants. At either step an AI may discriminate against prospective employees, and it 
is conceded that discrimination in the solicitation of applicants is less protected than denying 
applicants.114 That is not to say that it is not protected though, as a case predicated on that issue 
 
110 See Golden Spread Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt. Power & Water Sols., Inc., 954 F.3d 804 (5th 
Cir. 2020) (holding that under Texas law a purely economic loss is only recoverable under contract law). 
111 See Perez v. Vezer Indus. Pros., Inc., 610 F. App'x 611 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that under California law, 
indemnification clauses are generally enforceable). See also Royal Palm Hotel Prop., LLC v. Deutsche Lufthansa 
Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that although indemnification clauses 
are disfavored, they are enforced if an express intent to indemnify is clear and unequivocal). 
112 See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 425 (2008). 
113 See generally Greg Swanson, Non-Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Programs and Products Liability: How 
New Ai Products Challenge Existing Liability Models and Pose New Financial Burdens, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1201 (2019). 
114 Some courts have read Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 660-61 (1993) to allow claims based on the denial of opportunity to compete. See Robertson v. Allied 
Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (Holding that Art. III standing is met when a plaintiff complains she 
was deprived of a chance to obtain a benefit), Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that for standing 
may soon come the Northern District of California, after having been dismissed with leave to 
amend.115 
For the purposes of an employer’s liability in a disparate treatment case, the steps will be 
analyzed using Amazon’s AI as a fact pattern. The assumption will be that Amazon discovered 
the AI had developed a bias against women and used it for recruitment purposes anyway. Then a 
single fact will change; Amazon never discovered the algorithmic bias. This would turn the case 
into one of disparate impact, where intent is irrelevant. The disparate impact case will follow 
through into an analysis of whether or not the developer of the AI could be liable. Finally, 
Bradley will be examined as an example of a disparate treatment case where the employer 
intentionally set the program to discriminate and how the case’s deficits can be remedied. 
a. Disparate Treatment and Artificial Intelligence 
Beginning the hypothetical recruitment process, Amazon’s AI reaches out across the 
digital landscape and informs individuals about openings in their tech department. In doing so, it 
targets men specifically because it has decided women make inferior employees. The AI 
searches through LinkedIn pages for prospective employees with certain qualifications,116 
compiling a list of the men who meet them, and then sending them emails inviting them to apply 
for a position. Step one of the AI’s function is complete, it has reached out to potential applicants 
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and specifically denied communicating vacancies to women. This creates the first cause of 
action; denial of opportunity to compete. 
Although it seems obvious that this would be employment discrimination, bearing great 
resemblance to signs in the early 1900’s saying, “No Irish Need Apply,” this is perhaps the most 
difficult hurdle to jump. Technically Amazon has taken no action against these women, rather 
the claim would be based on inaction. Although Title VII and the ADEA both extend to 
applicants,117 neither addresses solicitation of applicants. This is a unique problem of the AI age, 
where someone can mass-broadcast a message while targeting the audience at the same time. 
Before the era of the household computer, jobs were advertised in windows, newspapers, and 
magazines and an employer could not filter who received notice. This modern problem is 
unlikely to see federal legislation in the next few years and such claims will rely on judicial 
interpretation of right of opportunity. 
In a jurisdiction with a narrow reading of the statute and standing, a claim based on 
discrimination in the solicitation of applications would not be actionable. In the Circuits that treat 
standing broadly, a plaintiff could sustain a claim they were discriminated against unlawfully by 
showing that they were denied an opportunity they were ready and able to act upon.118 The 
plaintiff would be able to form a prima facie case by proving 1) she belongs to a protected class, 
2) that she was able and ready to apply for the position, 3) despite her qualifications, she was 
denied, and 4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
people with the plaintiff’s qualifications. McDonald Douglas should apply in this situation 
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despite the plaintiff never being rejected for the position, creating a further framework for 
litigation. The solicitation of an application and the communication of a vacancy are both parts 
of the hiring process, as learning of a vacancy is the first step in any application process.  
Under McDonald Douglas, successfully presenting a prima facie case would shift the 
burden of proof to Amazon and require them to prove a nondiscriminatory reason for their 
decision. Should Amazon manage to prove that their AI which specifically filters out women is 
not discriminating on the basis of sex, the burden of proof would shift back to the plaintiff to 
prove it a pretext. This step of McDonald Douglas would prove a challenging hurdle given that 
the AI itself admits through its coding a discriminatory intent. AI discrimination in the 
solicitation phase creates a legal action against employers, and the tool to make recruitment 
easier becomes the instrument of the employer’s demise. 
After soliciting applications from these candidates, the AI further filters out the chaff. For 
the sake of simplicity, we will assume the AI only has an algorithmic bias against women and 
seeks to further eliminate any that may have made it through the net. This analysis is 
straightforward and avoids the standing pitfall of discrimination in the solicitation phase. The 
prima facie case plays out like a law school hypothetical; 1) the plaintiff proves she is a part of a 
protected class, 2) she applied and was qualified for a vacant position, 3) despite her 
qualifications, she was rejected, and 4) the position remained open, and the employer continued 
to seek applicants from people with the plaintiff’s qualifications. The McDonald Douglas 
framework works as designed and follows the same steps as it would in the solicitation phase 
without needing to adapt it for seeking applicants. 
The key to proving a disparate treatment case is proving the intent. When humans are the 
employers and hiring officers, the evidence of discriminatory motive and intent is often difficult 
to prove. Few are so kind to prospective plaintiffs as to write out every thought they have 
regarding applicants and their reasons for choosing one over another. As will be discussed in a 
later section, it is unlikely AI will be so kind either. Under existing legal framework, plaintiffs 
can make a case of disparate treatment at the hands of AI, and their employers are liable by 
knowingly using a system that intentionally discriminates based on a protected class. 
b. Disparate Impact and Artificial Intelligence 
In the circumstance that Amazon never discovered the AI’s bias, plaintiffs would bring a 
suit under disparate impact rather than disparate treatment. In the AI’s initial action, the first step 
of establishing standing will vex any potential plaintiff. A disparate impact claim has a unique 
advantage in this regard over disparate treatment, however. Disparate impact looks not at a 
specific instance or individual as does disparate treatment, but rather at the employer’s practice. 
If the practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, then the practice violates Title VII. 
Separate hiring channels serve as evidence of a disparate policy.119 Further, there is no mention 
of a “complaining party” needing to be an employee or applicant.120 As previously mentioned, 
notice of a vacancy is the first step in the application process and deliberately withholding and a 
system that deliberately withholds information from a protected class of individuals will violate 
this provision of Title VII. 
The facts fit the model for a disparate impact claim perfectly; the employer’s facially 
neutral system produces an adverse employment action against individuals based on being a part 
of a protected class. If the AI’s inner workings can be deciphered during discovery and proof of 
the AI’s self-developed bias against protected classes discovered, then the case seems an easy 
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win for plaintiffs. An issue to be tackled later, it is best to assume that the inner workings of an 
AI would not be available during discovery and plaintiffs are required to prove disparate impact 
more conventionally. 
Although the details and numbers of each case are unique to themselves, it is fair to 
assume that the AI would prove effective at its job. An AI would commit itself to filtering out all 
women from the application process, by failing to communicate vacancies to them and then 
removing any remaining female applicants from the resume pool. The AI’s success would be an 
employer’s failure, as plaintiffs would likely be able to show staggering disparity in the applicant 
and hiring pool. An AI curated resume pool that filtered out women could deliver to Amazon’s 
HR department a list of 300 applicants ready to hire, all of them men. A plaintiff offering an 
applicant pool zero-percent female makes a compelling case of systemic disparate impact. 
In terms of disparate impact cases, AI may prove too effective for their own good. 
Employers will want to be mindful of AI they utilize and monitor them closely for any rogue 
behavior. The lack of an intent requirement means even a good faith employer can find 
themselves liable under disparate impact. Worse yet, if they do discover a flaw in their system 
and continue to utilize the AI anyway, they establish a case of disparate treatment. Under the 
McDonald Douglas framework, a plaintiff could shift the burden of proof to the employer, and 
they would find it difficult to shift it back when their own tools paint them red-handed. 
c. Liabilities of Parties Under Disparate Impact 
If an AI develops its own algorithm to discriminate against suspect classes, an employer 
may be able to seek indemnification from the developer under a theory of product liability. 
Before establishing a claim of strict liability, the employer would need to prove that the AI is not 
being misused or abused, or rather that the use was a reasonable one.121 To establish a claim 
under strict liability, the employer would need to prove 1) the seller was engaged in the business 
of selling the product that caused the harm, 2) the product was defective when sold, 3) the 
product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, 4) the product was received by the 
consumer in substantially the same condition as produced, and 5) the plaintiff’s damages were a 
direct and proximate cause of the defect.122  
Although possible that an employer might find and repurpose an AI with a different 
purpose and use it for recruitment, it is more likely that an AI contracted for would be designed 
for the employer’s purpose. Both parties in any potential litigation will spend a great deal of time 
in their briefs addressing this as it ties in with the second element. It is a fair disagreement 
whether an employer is be solely responsible for the AI’s error, depending on how the AI is 
trained to accomplish its goal. If the employer is responsible for training the AI on desired 
qualities, the same way Amazon trained its AI on current employees, then the issue may not be a 
defect in design. Even then though, a sympathetic jury may find that the developer should have 
safeguards in place to protect against self-taught discrimination.  
Assuming the facts of the hypothetical case allow a permissible argument, the employer 
would proceed to establish their case. The first element is often easily satisfied, as the employer 
need only prove the seller of the software, or the developer, is responsible for distribution or 
development of the product. The second element is tied to the previously discussed step of 
whether the AI was reasonably used. If the employer’s actions were not the cause, or did not 
unreasonably cause the AI’s discriminatory pattern, then the AI was defective when sold. The 
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third element is perhaps the most difficult to prove as it requires the employer prove the product 
was unreasonably dangerous to use. This element generally pertains to physical harm and is why 
purely economic losses are pursued under contract law rather than tort.123 This analysis is still the 
most appropriate to use since the underlying cause of action, stemming from the act of 
discrimination in hiring is a tort.124  
The difficulty in addressing this element comes from the novel nature of AI in law. It is 
difficult to tell what a reasonable AI is, let alone how it should identify prospective employees or 
how to rank them. It is easy to wander astray when exploring the legal wilderness of novel 
claims, so this article shall leave the details of this topic to others. Suffice to say that this would 
be one of the major turning points in a defective design case regarding discriminating AI. The 
fourth element is another issue of complex and novel issue. The standard of substantially does 
not apply well to AI, whose very purpose is to change and adapt. The proper analysis for AI in a 
defective design analysis would take this into account and seek to establish that the core 
processes and functions of the AI had not changed. This equates to modification outside of 
developer software updates and minor adaption to an employer’s current system. The final 
element is if the employer’s damages were the direct and proximate cause of the defect. An 
employer could prove this by showing that but-for the alleged defect of the AI, learning 
discriminatory practices based on protected classes, the employer never would have engaged in 
discriminatory practices by proxy and never have been sued.  
In an ironic twist, a developer could rebut this element by claiming that the employer had 
a facially neutral yet discriminatory policy in place beforehand and the AI learned from this 
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violating practice. Many of these possible proofs an employer might make against a developer 
are rebuttable by both typical product liability defenses and even the claims of the original 
plaintiff bringing the employment discrimination claim themselves. A wary employer would be 
wise to contract for indemnification when licensing, purchasing, or paying for the development 
of an AI to avoid any more litigation outside well-defined law than is necessary. This rough 
adaptation of product liability in response to an adaptation of employment discrimination law to 
AI-based causes of action, which one could argue is a further and rougher adaptation of agency 
law, shows the need for legislative action. Employment is not alone in anticipating dramatic 
changes resulting from AI, and courts are poorly outfit for adapting to technical and alien causes 
of action. AI based causes of action are best described as alien, as they challenge many 
fundamental understandings of the law in these instances, and legislation is the best remedy.  
d. Bradley’s Folly 
A cynical reader will not be swayed by a hypothetical situation based on an AI that was 
scrapped early in its life. It has already been conceded that a case, Bradley, confronts some of 
these novel AI issues has already found its way to court and has been dismissed for lack of 
standing. There are two issues that make Bradley a troublesome case, standing and jurisdiction. 
These two issues are likely to surface in any claim derived from internet actions and are like 
many legal problems deriving from online causes of action.125 These problems require creative 
application of existing law written before the internet changed the world. Bradley is no different. 
Bradley is a class action, represented by four plaintiffs and the Communications Works 
of America (CWA) on behalf of older workers discriminated against by T-Mobile and Amazon 
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in employment advertising and recruitment.126 The defendants used Facebook to advertise 
vacancies to the public and used Facebook’s customizable algorithms to only show the 
advertisement to individuals between the ages of 18 and 38.127 T-Mobile and Amazon defend 
themselves by claiming that the plaintiffs had no desire to actually apply for the advertised job, 
and the age-targeting did not hinder their ability to compete for employment.128 The court 
dismissed the claim with leave to amend due to lack of standing and personal jurisdiction.129 The 
court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege that they personally 
were denied an opportunity to apply for jobs.130 The deficit of personal jurisdiction stems from 
the targeted advertisement lacking any geography; the online nature of the advertisement fails to 
establish any minimum contacts.131 
Bradley’s standing issue is unique because none of the plaintiffs applied for the positions 
advertised.132 Although all were able and ready to apply, none had actually taken the step to do 
so. Although some courts have indicated they are open to such a low bar for standing, the 
precedential Supreme Court cases of Northeastern133 and Adarand134 that lay out the right of 
opportunity to compete are opportunities for contracts. The plaintiffs in those cases operated 
business that routinely sought out and performed contracts, and this routine practice created an 
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inference that if the plaintiffs were ready and able to accept the contract, they would do so.135 It 
is typical that an individual will only seek out a job best fitting to them and regard more factors 
than a contractor might in pursuing a government contract. To properly apply this ready and able 
requirement to employment, a plaintiff must show an inclination towards that job.136 
There are two remedies to this issue of standing; the first is to plausibly allege that the 
plaintiff was actively seeking employment and applied for positions similar to the one the 
employer offered, and the second is to apply for the position challenged. The first remedy creates 
a stronger and more plausible foundation for a claim of a particularized and actual injury, since 
the standing requirement of a case under Article III requires such. An individual cannot bring a 
claim on behalf of an entire protected class and must plausibly allege that they were personally 
injured by the denial of information. By showing that the individual plaintiff would have applied 
for the position, beyond a mere statement in a legal complaint, would likely be sufficient to most 
courts to at least survive the pleading phase. 
The second solution may seem to avoid a fight on advertising entirely and double down 
on employment practices. To an extent, this is true. As previously discussed, the law grows 
slower than technology. There is certainly an argument to be made that the discrimination in 
advertising is actionable. Many would shudder at the thought that an employer could stand at the 
corner and hand out fliers soliciting employment applications, but only to white men under the 
age of 40. The function of the AI is little different than that, but most courts are not prepared to 
dive into the digital world and unknown field of AI. 
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The second issue is jurisdiction, a topic which haunts lawyers from their first days of law 
school. Establishing jurisdiction is a Herculean task in a digital era, but it is compounded in 
Bradley. Three plaintiffs of the four in Bradley are from outside the Northern District of 
California, with only Richard Haynie and the CWA residing in California. Further, the 
advertising campaign created by Amazon and T-Mobile and conducted by Facebook was 
international and lacked any specific geographic target. Here the deficit of Bradley comes from 
its nature as a class action. The claim is brought under the ADEA, a federal law, and establishes 
subject matter jurisdiction. A federal court would have personal jurisdiction in the state of 
Washington,137 and suit could appropriately be brought there.138 Likely for reasons of fiscal 
practicality, Bradley was brought in California because of the Northern District’s favorable 
precedent and courts and because that is where the CWA resides, and one of the largest 
communications and media labor union in the US likely funded the plaintiff’s action.139 Were the 
plaintiffs to bring suit in the Western District Court of Washington, they would avoid this 
jurisdictional issue. 
IV. Problems of Proving Liability 
Suppose the plaintiffs in Bradley remedy their deficits and a prospective plaintiff in the 
hypothetical Amazon case could establish their prima facie case. The complaint is filed, and an 
obligatory motion to dismiss is survived. Next comes summary judgment, which ends near 
seventy-seven percent of employment discrimination cases.140 Theories as to why so many cases 
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end at summary judgment vary from optimism that discrimination is on the decline, to the 
cynical belief that federal judges are hostile to employees bringing discrimination, and in the 
middle a pragmatic view that meritorious claims get settled.141 All agree on one issue though; 
proving intent is hard.142 
As previously mentioned, disparate treatment cases are the most common form of 
discrimination claim. Intent is a requirement of the complaint, and since open statements 
revealing unlawful discrimination are remarkably rare plaintiffs must prove intent 
circumstantially. Disparate impact claims fare little better despite not needing intent. Disparate 
impact requires proof that a system as a whole has a discriminatory effect, which is labor 
intensive in the best of times and often inconclusive. AI has the potential of flipping everything 
on its head. When an employer discriminates against an applicant, they often do their best to hide 
their shameful secret. A computer engraves its principle and puts it on the wall so that it never 
forgets. The grand question of this new frontier is how to find it.  
a. Traditional Evidentiary Issues in Discrimination Cases 
Although disparate treatment cases seek to prove intent and disparate impact cases seek 
to prove effect, they both find themselves climbing the same evidentiary mountains. The most 
glaring roadblock comes in the form of defining direct and circumstantial evidence.143 
Circumstantial evidence uses its common definition of evidence that supports drawing an 
inference of disputed fact, while direct evidence has only had definitions rejected by the 
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Supreme Court in an employment setting.144 This is relevant to the burden-shifting frame work 
of McDonald Douglas and other burden-shifting schemes.145 The nature of summary judgment 
exacerbates these issues since the nature of an employment discrimination claim is heavily 
contextual. Even though summary judgment views evidence in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party it inherently leads to the view of evidence in isolation and denies the 
cumulative and contextual weight of circumstantial evidence.146 
Unique to disparate treatment cases is the proving of intent, a difficult and fickle thing to 
pin down. The appeal of the McDonald Douglas framework is that making the prima facie case 
creates a presumption of discrimination, and therefore intent. This proves to be poor medicine for 
the evidentiary ill since the employer then provides a non-discriminatory reason, shifting the 
burden back to the plaintiff to prove the reason was a pretext. The plaintiff finds themselves 
holding the burden to prove pretext, and thus, intent with no further means to shift the burden. 
This burden often proves too much for plaintiffs since there is little Supreme Court guidance as 
to how much evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable question for the jury, and lower courts 
follow a cascading buildup of precedent supporting a high bar.147 As a matter of practice, this 
leads to judges often playing the role not as a gatekeeper of litigation but a single predisposed 
juror. 
Disparate impact claims may not need to prove intent, but their own issues make up for 
this. The most obvious is the difficulty in making a prima facie case. While on paper the 
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elements of a prima facie impact case seem lenient, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is 
“responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly 
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.”148 From there, the plaintiff must prove a 
correlation between the employment practices and the adverse effect and beat any defense an 
employer may raise about business relatedness of the practice and requirements.149 Added to this 
comes the difficulty of obtaining statistical evidence of the employer’s practice and the relevant 
labor market.150 
b. Unique Evidentiary Issues in AI 
AI has the potential to create entirely new frameworks for proving discrimination, 
because even in a disparate impact claim the AI would likely produce direct evidence of 
discrimination. An AI recruitment program is essentially a human resources agent that writes 
everything thought as a note, and meticulously writes out how it reaches a decision. Obtaining 
these notes hidden in the AI’s code and logs would be incontrovertible evidence of 
discrimination. The lines of code that reveal a discriminatory intent are a philosopher’s stone; a 
mythical object that can turn the weakest case into solid gold. Unfortunately, the AI writes these 
notes for its own purpose, not for a potential plaintiff and those meticulous notes read out as a 
never-ending sentence with far too many parentheses and not enough words. 
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Before an eager plaintiff begins their quest for the legend, they will have to pass through 
the gates of discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline the scope of discovery,151 
and case law fleshes out the rules. The recurring theme of AI in law is prevalent here as well, as 
the nature of AI proves difficult to fit within existing legal framework. AI are more often 
protected by secrecy than copyright law since copyright law does not adequately extend to AI 
and self-generated code.152 Due to the importance of secrecy in AI development, employers and 
developers alike will fight tooth and nail to prevent any discovery into the code of an AI. 
Although Supreme Court precedent provides an edge for plaintiffs,153 the actual practice of 
granting discovery requests and what can and cannot be discovered is “within the sound 
discretion of the trial court…”154 How courts will treat discovery requests peering into the inner 
machinations of a program that has grown past the original programming of the developer is an 
educated guess every time a motion for discovery is made. The policy and legal arguments for 
strict discovery rules versus favorable treatment towards plaintiffs go both ways and are likely to 
result in cases within cases at the discovery stage. 
Assuming a favorable outcome in a discovery request, attorneys and plaintiffs looking for 
gold in code had best be wary. The complicated and technical nature of AI could mean they 
spend immense resources and efforts looking for gold only to end up empty handed. Where 
traditional discrimination claims leave plaintiffs grasping for evidentiary straws, AI threatens to 
give plaintiffs too much. The very expectation of direct evidence may even make the traditional 
summary judgment wall impassable. Courts may expect that if an AI discriminates, there will be 
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clear and direct evidence in the code. Should a plaintiff fail to find it, courts and jurors alike may 
assume that to mean there is no discrimination. Plaintiffs may very well ask themselves if the 
search is worth the costs and the risk, choosing instead to establish AI discrimination through 
traditional means.  
V. Conclusion 
Our legal system operates much like an AI does. The federal and state constitutions are 
the original code that create our program. Legal minds encounter problems and write new rules 
to better equip themselves with future problems and learn from the experiences. The strength of 
our system comes from its adaptability. Much like an AI, we have encountered a new problem in 
the world of employment law. The algorithms, the laws, that currently exist for this problem are 
Title VII, the ADEA, and existing case law. Applying these laws to the new facts of AI 
discriminating against individuals generates an outcome familiar to our system. If an employer’s 
facially neutral system has a disparate impact on a protected class, it is actionable under the law. 
If an employer intentionally discriminates against an individual due to their status as a protected 
class and it results in disparate treatment, it is actionable under the law.  
AI is a powerful tool that is changing the world and revolutionizing the digital era, but it 
is a tool, nonetheless. AI should be treated as such in accordance with existing law to reach the 
desired and just outcome of protecting those within the scope of Title VII and the ADEA, and 
users of AI should be aware they are liable for the actions caused by their tools. Likewise, job 
applicants and their attorneys should be aware that although AI will change the legal landscape, 
many familiar obstacles will remain. Proving claims will remain an uphill battle, and McDonald 
Douglas will still appear in more briefs than it will not. No AI, not IBM’s Watson nor HAL 
9000, is powerful enough to change McDonald Douglas.  
